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In
1997, responding to more of the forensic void elsewhere in Bosnia,
where at least an additional 15,000 had gone missing, PHR, which
is primarily a human rights fact-finding group, not traditionally
a capacity-building organization, expanded its presence in Bosnia
and provided to all local entities- Serb, Croat, and Bosnian Muslim-
forensic training, equipment, and documentation of the local exhumation
process.
Also in 1997, with no identification
effort underway, no family's uncertainty put to an end, and over
500 exhumed from Srebrenica-including remains recovered with strong
leads such as distinctive jewelry or personal papers- PHR began
the Srebrenica Identification Project. PHR trained Bosnian staff
to follow up on leads, work closely with victim families, and provided
mitochondrial DNA analysis to conclude cases for which physical
features were not sufficiently conclusive. In mid-1997, PHR provided
local forensic pathologists with the scientific evidence necessary
to conclude the first set of Srebrenica identifications. The families
of the identified invariably changed through the long process, moving
from their fervent belief that their missing were alive to a certainty
that their loved one's body had been identified.
The
PHR Srebrenica Identification Project had no authority or control
over the remains and other crucial resources, such as a morgue,
and so depended on the goodwill of international institutions, like
The Hague tribunal, as well as national resources, such as the tunnel
storage facility, local forensic pathologists, and Tuzla's hospital
morgue. However, absent both a political commitment to Srebrenica
identifications and a sense of the system necessary to achieve scientifically
sound identifications, the goodwill and cooperation of these actors
were frequently missing. The hospital, for instance, refused access
to its morgue and would not allow its pathologists to engage in
Srebrenica autopsies. This created a bottleneck in PHR's identification
system, which was compounded by the recovery of an additional 2,000
bodies and body parts from the ICTY's 1998 Srebrenica exhumations
and the lack of a place to put them. Protesting lack of funding
for the remains already in custody, officials in charge of the tunnels
of remains from Srebrenica refused to accept more bodies. Without
proper storage facilities, the 2,000 body bags' bodies were left
in containers in a parking lot, which angered the family associations.
Without access to the tunnels or, for that matter, parking lot containers,
the recovery of surface remains came to a virtual halt.
By 1998, many of the Srebrenica survivors began to acknowledge that
their missing might be dead. They despaired over the slow pace of
the exhumation process and demanded that the remains be recovered
for their loved ones and to demonstrate the nature and scale of
the crimes committed. The survivors wanted the world to acknowledge
that they had been victims of genocide, and the remains provided
their proof. But the ICTY's timetable for exhuming the Srebrenica
graves held the unearthed remains essentially hostage to prosecutorial
priorities and The Hague's logistical capacity. Survivor voices
had little, if any, effect of the pace of the investigations.
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Caught
in a limbo between hope and grief. the survivors of Srebrenica can
neither return to their past lives nor plan for the future. They
live with the pain of what they themselves endured, coupled with
the anquish of not knowing the fate of their loved ones..
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